Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers revenue maximization in the online stochastic setting with non-preemptive jobs and a unit capacity server. One agent/job arrives at every time step, with parameters drawn from the underlying distribution. We design a posted-price mechanism which can be efficiently computed and is revenue-optimal in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent’s type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic, depending only on the length of the allotted time interval and on the earliest time the server is available. We also prove that the proposed pricing strategy is robust to imprecise knowledge of the job distribution and that a distribution learned from polynomially many samples is sufficient to obtain a near-optimal truthful pricing strategy.
Dettaglio pubblicazione
2022, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS, Pages 11- (volume: 36)
Online revenue maximization for server pricing (01a Articolo in rivista)
Boodaghians S., Fusco F., Leonardi S., Mansour Y., Mehta R.
Gruppo di ricerca: Algorithms and Data Science
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