Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica, automatica e gestionale

Focusing on two different European institutional contexts, a stated preference approach is adopted to elicit the willingness to save water under three alternative incentive policies: a water price increase, monetary reward, and symbolic prize. In addition, two water scarcity scenarios, a ‘critical’ and a ‘regular’ scenario, are devised to analyze how information on water scarcity moderates the effect of incentives. Empirical results show that users become sensitive to monetary incentives (while they remain insensitive to non-monetary ones) when water is scarce. Batteries of pre-tests on the sample and robustness checks on the results strengthen the reliability of our findings and partially circumvent concerns related to the use of a stated preference approach. The study adds to the literature on the efficacy of economic incentives in the water sector and the role of local factors in explaining water users’ response.